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Cooperative behavior is widespread among humans and the animal kingdom. It occurs 
in very simple organisms like social amoebae (Santorelli, Thompson et al. 2008), 
viruses (Turner and Chao 2003), eusocial insects (Nowak, Tarnita et al. 2010), fish 
(Bshary and Grutter 2006), birds (Ligon 1983), non-human primates (Cheney, 
Moscovice et al. 2010) and, of course, humans (Melis and Semmann 2010). However, 
in terms of evolution by natural selection, such cooperative behavior seems to be harder 
to explain than selfish behavior. The heart of the problem can be conveniently described 
with the language of game theory. Game theory is a mathematical theory to describe 
game-like situations. Originally, game theory was used to analyze classic games like 
chess or poker (Zermelo 1913). Soon, economists realized that it can be applied to a 
variety of economic interactions (e.g. Nash Jr 1950). Since the 1970’s, evolutionary 
game theory became a big field of research by itself (Smith and Price 1973), extending 
its applications to biology, ecology, mathematics, physics and many more branches. 
So, how does game theory help to understand the evolution of cooperation? One of the 
most prominent examples of a “game” in the sense of game theory is the so-called 
prisoner’s dilemma game. Here, we assume that two players must decide 
simultaneously between two options. They can either (i) cooperate or (ii) defect. Their 
earnings depend on both, their own action and the action of the other player. If player I 
cooperated, but player II defected, player I receives the so-called suckers payoff S and 
player II gets the temptation T. If both players cooperate, they receive the reward R and, 
finally if both defect, they receive the punishment P. The precise numerical values of S, 
8 
 
T, R and P can vary but the order between them is characteristic for the prisoner’s 
dilemma game: 
T > R > P > S 
Note that irrespective of the other player’s action, defecting always yields the better 
result, because T > R and P > S. However, if both players defect, they receive less than 
if both had cooperated. Thus, self-interested behavior leads to a poor outcome for both 
players. More generally, situations where group-interest and self-interest are in conflict 
are called social dilemmas. Another prominent example besides the prisoner’s dilemma 
is the so-called public goods game, which describes a similar situation for more than 
two players. 
Clearly, without any modification of this game, cooperative behavior cannot persist 
since defectors will always bring home the higher payoff. However, if embedded in a 
certain context, cooperation might be able to out-compete defection. Because such 
contexts work like a mechanism to promote cooperative behavior, they are often 
referred to as “mechanisms of cooperation”. One well-established distinction between 
such mechanisms is due to Martin Nowak (Nowak 2006):  
Mechanisms of Cooperation: 
- kin selection 
- direct reciprocity 
- indirect reciprocity 
- group (multi-level) selection 
- network reciprocity 
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Kin selection (Hamilton 1964) refers to a situation where closely related individuals 
encounter a social dilemma. A gene that codes for cooperative behavior can be selected 
for, because helping close relatives implies helping bearers of this very gene. Famous 
examples are eusocial insects. 
Direct reciprocity (Trivers 1971) is a straight-forward mechanism where we imagine 
that the prisoner’s dilemma game is played repeatedly. As long as the chance to 
encounter an individual in the future is high enough, cooperative behavior can out-
compete defective behavior. Since multiple rounds of prisoner’s dilemma games are 
played, individuals can adopt potentially infinitely many strategies (i.e. combinations of 
cooperate and defect). The famous computer tournament by the political scientist Robert 
Axelrod (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) aimed to detect best-performing strategies. It is 
remarkable that of all participating strategies, one of the simplest turned out to perform 
best: It played “cooperate” in the first round and then copied the opponent’s move of the 
previous round; therefore it was called Tit-for-Tat. 
Indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund 1998) works somewhat similar, except that 
the cooperative action is received by a third person. Cooperative behavior can succeed if 
individuals cooperate only with “good” individuals, but defect with “bad” individuals. 
Here, “good” individuals are those who helped others whereas “bad” individuals are 
those who did not help. Thus, reputation is the essence of indirect reciprocity. 
Multi-level selection (e.g. Traulsen and Nowak 2006) refers to the fact that there might 
be different units of selection: Genes, groups of genes, individuals or groups of 
individuals. What might appear as cooperative behavior at one level of selection could 
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be something different at another level. If selection is faster on the latter level, 
cooperation on the former level could persist. 
Network reciprocity is in the focus of the larger part of this thesis (chapter I) and thus 
deserves a more thorough introduction. In the 90’s of the previous century, an 
evolutionary model (Nowak and May 1992) showed that cooperation could, in 
principle, be promoted by spatial structure. Here, individuals interact with neighbors, 
instead of with random individuals of the entire population. Thus, cooperators can 
assort into clusters and achieve higher payoffs than defectors. Interestingly, 
experimental attempts to find evidence of such a cooperation-enhancing mechanism in 
humans failed (Cassar 2007; Kirchkamp and Nagel 2007; Grujić, Fosco et al. 2010; 
Traulsen, Semmann et al. 2010; Gracia-Lázaro, Ferrer et al. 2012; Grujić, Rohl et al. 
2012). To understand this, we must look at the assumptions of the evolutionary model. 
First, it uses the prisoner’s dilemma game (see above) to model the interaction. Another 
model (Hauert and Doebeli 2004) showed that a very similar but slightly different 
game, the snowdrift game (Sugden 1986), does not lead to cooperation under the same 
circumstances. The only difference between the snowdrift game and the prisoner’s 
dilemma game is that in the former, the order of payoffs is T > R > S > P. However, the 
above-mentioned experiments failed to show increased cooperation on spatial structure 
despite using the prisoner’s dilemma game. The most likely reason for this is that 
humans do not update their behavior in any way that is assumed by evolutionary 
models. In general, evolutionary models consist of two major parts. First, the interaction 
between individuals is modeled, e.g. as a prisoner’s dilemma game. Second, 
assumptions are made how individuals update their behavior in the game, e.g. whether 
they cooperate or defect. So-called imitation updating is one of the most frequently used 
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update mechanisms in evolutionary models. Therefore, we shall look at it in more 




Figure 1. Segment of a network. Circles represent individuals, connected individuals can interact. 
 
Lines between individuals mean that they can interact with each other (e.g. play a 
prisoner’s dilemma game). Let us focus on the blue individual. The other individuals 
may also have interactions with other individuals that are not shown in Fig.1. The 
algorithm of a typical evolutionary model could look like this: 
Step 1 
Individuals play prisoner’s dilemma games with all their neighbors (neighbors are 
indicated by a line between individuals). Their payoff from all of their prisoner’s 
dilemma games is summed up and is called their payoff. An example of possible 




Figure 2. Examples of possible payoffs resulting from prisoner’s dilemma games. 
 
Step 2 
To calculate the fitness, we use the function 
fitness = 1 - w + w * payoff 
where the selection coefficient w determines the strength of selection: w = 1 for strong 
selection and w → 0 for weak selection. Thus, we get the fitness following values 
(Fig.3.) 
 




















Note that we can always choose a w such that the fitness of all possible payoffs is 
positive, which is important for calculating the relative fitness: 
Step 3 
relative fitness = fitness / (sum of fitness of all agents) 
 
Figure 4. Relative fitness of individuals. 
 
The relative fitness determines the probability that the target player will have the 
strategy of the respective agents in the next round. In this case, target node will keep its 
strategy with probability 27%, and will switch to the strategy of one of its neighbors 












As we can see, evolutionary models like the one described assume rather specific and 
simplified learning behavior about the individuals. This may be a justifiable abstraction 
for very simple organisms, but it seems very unrealistic for humans. A recent study 
suggests that humans learning behavior resembles closely to so-called moody 
conditional cooperation (Grujić, Gracia-Lázaro et al. 2014). Here, individuals are more 
likely to cooperate if they, themselves cooperated in the previous round and are 
surrounded by enough other cooperators. However, as an updating mechanism, moody 
conditional cooperation does not seem to promote network reciprocity (Gracia-Lázaro, 
Cuesta et al. 2012). Therefore, static networks do not enhance cooperation among 
humans 
However, the situation is different on dynamic networks. In contrast to the static 
networks that we discussed above, dynamic networks allow the individuals to change 
their neighbors over time. Recent models (e.g. Santos, Pacheco et al. 2006; Fu, Hauert 
et al. 2008; Pacheco, Traulsen et al. 2008; Fu, Wu et al. 2009; Wu, Zhou et al. 2010) 
have shown that dynamic networks allow for cooperation levels beyond the ones of 
static networks. Unlike with static networks, experiments with human participants did 
indeed show increased cooperation on dynamic networks (Fehl, van der Post et al. 2011; 
Rand, Arbesman et al. 2011; Wang, Suri et al. 2012). However, as I argue in chapter I, 
the main reason for this is different from the mechanisms suggested in the models. 
Although models use a variety of different assumptions, the cooperation levels always 
depend on how often individuals change their neighbours. In chapter I, I provide 
evidence where cooperation levels only depend on whether participants have the option 
to change their partners, but not on how often they actually do it. 
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While in evolution of cooperation, the state of empirical research is constantly lagging 
behind the development of new models, the situation seems to be rather opposite in 
behavioural psychology. In chapter II, I will develop a normative model of decision 
making. Although this is a rather different topic than the evolution of cooperation I will 
point out in the general discussion section of this thesis how the two topics could inspire 
each other. One important aspect of decision making is how to evaluate available 
information, e.g. advice from experts. A robust finding from various experiments (e.g. 
Harvey and Fischer 1997; Yaniv and Kleinberger 2000)  is that participants do not use 
the information given by advisors in an optimal way, although advice generally 
increases the accuracy of judgements (e.g. Sniezek, Schrah et al. 2004; Gino and 
Schweitzer 2008; Minson, Liberman et al. 2011). A good framework to study how 
humans use information by peers is the so-called Judge-Advisor-System (Sniezek and 
Buckley 1995). Here, one person, “judge”, first estimates an unknown quantity. Then, 
the judge gets advice from another independent person, the “advisor”. Finally, the judge 
adjusts her or his estimate by taking into account the advisor’s estimate. The question is 
how much weight should be put on either of the two initial estimates. The most 
prominent model on the Judge-Advisor-System (Soll and Larrick 2009) focuses on two 
strategies: averaging and choosing. Averaging is a strategy that weights both initial 
estimates equally and in the choosing strategy one first attempts to find out the more 
accurate initial guess and neglect the other. To this end, the model (Soll and Larrick 
2009) uses three parameters: the ability differences between judge and advisor (A), the 
probability that the judge can identify these differences (P) and the amount of 
systematic bias of both judge and advisor (R). It is called (R) because systematic bias of 
judge and advisor leads to redundant information. Because of these three parameters, 
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the model has become known as the PAR model. The main predictions from the PAR 
models are that judges should prefer the averaging strategy in most cases. Only if the 
ability differences are large and easy to detect, choosing outperforms averaging. 
Additionally, choosing performs well if the amount of systematic bias is very high. In 
this case, both estimates tend to either over- or underestimate the target quantity and 
therefore choosing outperforms averaging. Although the restriction to these two simple 
strategies seems to be backed up by their empirical data, where roughly 70% of the 
participants used one of the two, neither of them is optimal, except in rare examples. 
Therefore, I will present a model that compares the two strategies with a more accurate 
weighting strategy (which shall simply be called weighting). Weighting aims to identify 
the ability difference quantitatively (i.e. not only who is better, but also how much) and 
then assign weights accordingly. In chapter II, I derive a mathematical model to show 
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Social networks represent the structuring of interactions between group members. 
Above all, many interactions are profoundly cooperative in humans and other animals. 
In accordance with this natural observation, theoretical work demonstrates that certain 
network structures favour the evolution of cooperation. Yet recent experimental 
evidence suggests that static networks do not enhance cooperative behaviour in humans. 
In contrast, dynamic networks do foster cooperation. However, costs associated with 
dynamism like time or resource investments in finding and establishing new 
partnerships have been neglected so far. Here, we show that human participants are 
much less likely to break links when costs arise for building new links. Especially, 
when costs were high the network was nearly static. Surprisingly, cooperation levels in 
prisoner’s dilemma games were not affected by reduced dynamism in social networks. 
We conclude that the mere potential to quit collaborations is sufficient in humans to 
reach high levels of cooperative behaviour. Effects of self-structuring processes or 
assortment on the network played a minor role: participants simply adjusted their 
cooperative behaviour in response to the threats of losing a partner or of being expelled. 
 
KEYWORDS cooperation, dynamic network, partner switching, prisoner’s dilemma, 







One common way to deal with an unpleasant peer is to get out of her or his way and 
to become friends with someone else. In fact, the breaking of links serves as an effective 
mechanism to control cheating in social relationships and the evolution of cooperation 
among unrelated individuals (e.g. Santos, Pacheco et al. 2006; Fu, Hauert et al. 2008; 
Pacheco, Traulsen et al. 2008; Fu, Wu et al. 2009; Wu, Zhou et al. 2010). The process 
of finding new friends leads to assortment and populations with a social structure. First, 
this means that not all but only subsets of individuals interact with each other. Second, 
the social structure is dynamic. As such, dynamism in social networks has for instance 
been described in humans (Kossinets and Watts 2006; Saramäki, Leicht et al. 2014), 
bottlenose dolphins (Lusseau and Newman 2004), or chacma baboons (Henzi, Lusseau 
et al. 2009). Recent experiments (Fehl, van der Post et al. 2011; Rand, Arbesman et al. 
2011; Wang, Suri et al. 2012) show that human cooperation is substantially higher in 
dynamic networks compared to static ones. For that matter, static network structures - 
though in theory impacting cooperation positively (Nowak and May 1992; but see 
Hauert and Doebeli 2004; Lieberman, Hauert et al. 2005; Ohtsuki, Hauert et al. 2006) - 
have trouble producing cooperative outcomes in experimental settings (Cassar 2007; 
Kirchkamp and Nagel 2007; Grujić, Fosco et al. 2010; Traulsen, Semmann et al. 2010; 
Gracia-Lázaro, Ferrer et al. 2012; Grujić, Rohl et al. 2012). It has to be noted that while 
most of the mentioned research assume that individuals make one decision for all 
partners, we allow them to choose freely for each of their partners, as in (Fehl, van der 
Post et al. 2011; Rand, Arbesman et al. 2011; Wang, Suri et al. 2012). This setup seems 
to be more realistic for human societies. 
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Conscious care of one’s partnerships is beneficial for cooperation in humans. Both, 
evolutionary models and experiments, show that the directed breaking of social links to 
cheaters or so-called defectors in joint endeavours eventually leads to cooperative 
outcomes (Fu, Wu et al. 2009; Szolnoki and Perc 2009; Perc and Szolnoki 2010; Wu, 
Zhou et al. 2010; Fehl, van der Post et al. 2011; Rand, Arbesman et al. 2011; Wang, 
Suri et al. 2012; Shirado, Fu et al. 2013); further, long-term relationships occur between 
like-minded cooperators (Pacheco, Traulsen et al. 2006; Santos, Pacheco et al. 2006; Fu, 
Hauert et al. 2008; Wu, Zhou et al. 2010; Fehl, van der Post et al. 2011; Wang, Suri et 
al. 2012). However, not only humans make use of partner switching as control 
mechanism to achieve cooperative outcomes: Long-nosed parrotfishes stop interacting 
(at least temporarily) with their cleaner wrasses and choose a different cleaner station 
when being cheated on (Bshary and Schäffer 2002).  
Real-world interactions offer a large variety of potential costs of partner switching in 
terms of resources like food, grooming, or money. Further, psychological, effort- and 
time-based costs may also occur. Theoretical evidence is sparse in regard to modelling 
link-related or partner switching-related costs and their effects on the evolution of 
cooperation. When costs in terms of distance - the further away a partner the larger 
associated (e.g. contacting or traveling) costs - arise for individuals, they are prone to 
choose those in close reach and hence with lower associated costs (Li, Min et al. 2013). 
Other approaches impacting the evolution of cooperation include the introduction of 
migration costs (Liu, Chen et al. 2012), participation costs (Masuda 2007; Szolnoki, 
Perc et al. 2008), and time-related costs (Poncela, Gómez-Gardeñes et al. 2011). 
Surprisingly, present experiments on cooperative behaviour in dynamic human 
networks (Fehl, van der Post et al. 2011; Rand, Arbesman et al. 2011; Wang, Suri et al. 
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2012; Shirado, Fu et al. 2013) assume that altering partners is cost-free. In sum, 
exploring the consequences of partner-switching costs on cooperation need to be 
investigated as the experimental evidence is lagging behind of insights of natural 
observations and the development of models.  
While partner-switching costs might impact the positive effect of dynamic social 
networks on cooperative behaviour, they can also affect the dynamism per se. 
Conflicting work exists on the question how much partner switching in dynamic 
networks is optimal. On the one hand, higher rates of network dynamism should 
generally lead to more cooperation (Santos, Pacheco et al. 2006; Fu, Hauert et al. 2008; 
Rand, Arbesman et al. 2011; Wang, Suri et al. 2012). On the other hand, recent work 
suggest that the optimal rate of changing partners must be in medium ranges (Fu, Wu et 
al. 2009; Shirado, Fu et al. 2013) or the maximum number of partners has to be limited 
(Szolnoki, Perc et al. 2008; Szolnoki and Perc 2009). If defective individuals switch 
their partners too rapidly, they can exploit newly-linked partners and thus will out-
compete cooperative individuals. According to (Fowler and Christakis 2010), another 
reason may be that defectors need to stay connected to cooperators in order to learn and 
adopt their strategy, yet recent experimental data suggest that humans imitate only 
selfish behaviour, but not cooperative behaviour (Jordan, Jordan et al. 2013). Former 
studies (Fu, Hauert et al. 2008; Fu, Wu et al. 2009; Wang, Suri et al. 2012; Shirado, Fu 
et al. 2013) approach this question by controlling for how often partners can be 
exchanged. Instead, we will keep the opportunity to switch partners at a maximum and 
constant throughout treatments, but expect that varying levels of costs influence partner-
switching rates - with a so far unexplored impact on cooperative behaviour in humans.  
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Here, we examine the cooperative behaviour of human participants while either a 
static social structure or dynamic social structures define interaction partners. The 
switching of partners in dynamic networks occurs at (i) no, (ii) low, or (iii) high costs 
(i.e. breaking of social links is cost-free; however, costs occur for setting up a new link). 
Participants interact with three partners and play independent prisoner’s dilemma games 
(PD; Rapoport and Chammah 1965; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; see Electromic 
Supplementary Material [ESM] for a game decription). Only if the game allows for 
repeated interactions then direct reciprocity (Trivers 1971; Nowak and Sigmund 1992; 
Nowak and Sigmund 1993) can produce cooperative outcomes. In general, as our 
experimental setup permits repeated interactions without a known endpoint, we expect 
cooperative behaviour of participants in both social structures. In particular, cooperation 
levels are predicted to be higher in the three dynamic networks (despite possible costs 
for partner switching). Especially, we will address the impact of costs of partner 
switching in dynamic networks: As costs for new partners increase, we expect 
participants’ tendency to end partnerships will decrease and hence reduce the dynamism 
in the network. We therefore infer reduced cooperative behaviour under low and high 
costs compared to no costs for partner switching. Nonetheless, we predict to find 
directed link breaking in all dynamic network setup: mainly to unwanted, that is to 
defective, participants. In addition, we will examine the specific link-breaking 




MATERIAL AND METHODS 
The participants 
We conducted computerized experiments with 400 students, tested in fall 2009 and 
2012. Students were recruited from a German University via the online recruitment 
system ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and came from a broad range of disciplines. They were 
composed of 49% females and were aged 22.07 ± 3.194 (mean ± s.d.). Upon arrival 
participants were randomly seated in front of computers separated by opaque partitions. 
Participants were informed via written instructions about the game rules (available upon 
request) and came to know that their decisions were made anonymous towards other 
participants and the experimenters. They were forbidden to communicate except via 
computers. To allow for in-game identification while ensuring anonymity in regard to 
their real identity participants were given pseudonyms (randomly-assigned names of 
moons of the solar system). These pseudonyms were also used to ensure anonymous 
payment at the end (as described in Semmann, Krambeck et al. 2005; known by 
participants from written instructions). Sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes and 
participants earned 17.53€ ± 5.02.  
 
Static-network treatment and three dynamic-network treatments 
We ran 10 sessions for each of our four treatments with 10 participants in each 
session, respectively: STATIC, DYNAMIC, DYNAMIC10 and DYNAMIC50 (see 
ESM Fig. S1-S5). 
For STATIC interaction partners of participants were defined by the structure of the 
so-called Petersen graph (Holton and Sheehan 1993). This graph consists of 10 nodes 
(vertices; here players) and each node is linked to exactly three other nodes summing up 
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to a total of 15 interaction links. Importantly, players have identical starting positions in 
terms of network properties. Note, that participants did not receive any information 
regarding the network nor their position within. At the beginning of each session, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of these nodes. With each of their three 
linked partners, participants played independent PD games (i.e. different decisions 
could be made for different partners). Each of the three games lasted 30 rounds. To 
avoid end-round effects, participants were not informed about the duration. In each PD 
round, participants simultaneously decided whether to cooperate or to defect. However, 
instead of saying “to cooperate” and “to defect” we used the terms “ORANGE” and 
“BLUE” to avoid morally burdened language (cf. Fehl, van der Post et al. 2011). After 
all decisions in a PD round were made, participants were shown their own and their 
partners’ decisions and payoffs. For mutual cooperation (defection) the players received 
0.25€ (0.00€) and if one player cooperated and the other defected the former received -
0.10€ while the latter received 0.40€. Participants received only local information, that 
is, they were not informed about the outcomes and payoffs resulting from their partners’ 
interactions with others. Thereafter, the next round of PD games started. This treatment 
is called STATIC, because the network did not change throughout the experiment (no 
partner switching allowed). 
Generally, in the three dynamic treatments the initial network in form of the Petersen 
graph could change over time due to link breaking (in all treatments, the maximum 
number of partners remained limited to three). DYNAMIC followed the setup of 
STATIC. Participants played three independent PD games but in addition they were 
given the option to quit any of their partnerships after learning the results of the current 
PD round. Independent link-breaking decisions were made. For a link to be broken, at 
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least one player had to decide to end the partnership. Thereafter, participants were 
informed about their and their partners’ decisions. For each broken link, participants 
were randomly re-assigned to any other participant with less than three partners. 
Afterwards, the next round would start. Because of the random re-linking procedure, 
occasionally no partner could be found and participants had less than three partners 
(known by participants from written instructions; this situation generates the same 
payoff as mutual defection in partnerships, 0.00€). Further, depending on the total 
number of broken links in the network, there was a chance to get re-linked to the same 
partner (which could be noticed by pseudonyms).  
In DYNAMIC10 and DYNAMIC50, participants made PD decisions followed by 
link-breaking decisions and, additionally, were asked - if they had less than three 
partners - whether they would like to buy a new link at the cost of 0.10€ / 0.50€, 
respectively, or not. Thus, there was no automatic re-linking to other available 
participants. The program randomly assigned partners to those willing to buy a new 
link; otherwise participants did not receive a new partner in the current round. If no new 
partner could be connected, the costs were not deducted. Note, that only in 
DYNAMIC10 participants could immediately compensate the costs of a new link either 
due to mutual cooperation (0.25€ payoff - 0.10€ costs) or due to exploitation of the new 
partner (0.40€ payoff - 0.10€ costs). However, DYNAMIC50 would require either the 
sum of payoffs of at least two partners or the sum of payoffs of at least two rounds with 






We conducted group-level analyses as the behaviour of participants within each 
session was interdependent and thus required the unit of analysis to be groups rather 
than individuals. For statistical analysis R 2.15.2 (R Core Team 2013) was used. 
Probabilities are reported as two tailed at a 5%-significance level. Pairwise comparisons 
were corrected using the Bonferroni method (reported below are corrected probabilities 







Link-breaking behaviour in dynamic networks 
Overall, the experiment showed that costs for setting new links affected the 
willingness of participants to break them. We found significant differences in the link-
breaking rate between each of the three dynamic treatments: the higher the costs, the 
lower the link-breaking rate (Fig. 1a; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: DYNAMIC vs. 
DYNAMIC10: W = 0, n1,2 = 10, p < 0.001; DYNAMIC vs. DYNAMIC50: W = 0, n1,2 = 




Figure 1. Average rates of link breaking in the dynamic networks (a) and average cooperation levels in 
the prisoner’s dilemma games (b). Interactions occurred either on a static structure (STATIC) or on 
dynamic structures. Here, social links could be broken after each round. Setting new links was either cost-





















































Additionally, we found that links were broken mostly during the first few rounds of 
the experiment (Fig. 2; comparing link-breaking rates of the average of rounds 1 to 10 
against rounds 21 to 30, Wilcoxon signed-rank test: DYNAMIC: V = 0, n = 10, p < 




Figure 2. Average link-breaking rates over rounds. Participants played prisoner’s dilemma games with 
three partners and could break social links after each round. Setting new links was either cost-free 
(DYNAMIC), or else low costs of 0.10€ (DYNAMIC10) or high costs of 0.50€ (DYNAMIC50) arose. 
Average link-breaking rates differed significantly between treatments (p’s < 0.05) and link-breaking rates 
significantly decreased over time (p’s < 0 .01). 
 
 
Now, we asked which behaviour was likely to trigger link breaking. Generally, 
within all dynamic treatments significantly more links were broken to defectors than to 
cooperators (break rate to defectors: DYNAMIC: 82.9% ± 8.3; DYNAMIC10 89.5% ± 
7.0; DYNAMIC50: 91.3% ± 7.5; Wilcoxon signed-rank test: V = 0, n = 10, p < 0.01 for 
all dynamic treatments). Here, we also found that the link-breaking rates to defectors 
marginally significantly differed between the dynamic treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test: 
χ² = 5.17, df = 2, p = 0.075). Moreover, when taking the participants own behaviour into 






























such a link. Out of a total of 4706 mutually-cooperative PD outcomes in DYNAMIC50 




Cooperative behaviour in the prisoner’s dilemma games 
Next, we examined the cooperative behaviour of participants as well as its relation to 
link-breaking behaviour. The overall cooperation levels between the four treatments 
were significantly different. Detailed analysis revealed that cooperation levels were 
significantly lower in STATIC compared to all dynamic treatments (Fig. 1b; Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test: STATIC vs. DYNAMIC: W = 4, n1,2 = 10, p < 0.001; STATIC vs. 
DYNAMIC10: W = 13, n1,2 = 10, p < 0.05; STATIC vs. DYNAMIC50: W = 5, n1,2 = 10, 
p < 0.01, for a round-by-round figure, see ESM Fig S2). However, we did not find 
significant differences between the dynamic treatments themselves (see ESM Tab. S2). 
To understand the high levels of cooperation in the dynamic treatments despite very 
different dynamism in the networks (note, the network structure in DYNAMIC50 was 
nearly static), we first looked at the readiness to cooperate when a participant received a 
newly linked partner (i.e. participants who had no current partnership, but who might 
have met each other before; behaviour of the first round was excluded). We found 
significantly higher cooperation levels of participants with a new link in DYNAMIC50 
than in DYNAMIC (Fig. 3; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: W = 10, n1,2
 = 10, p < 0.01; see 
ESM Tab. S3). Second, we examined the willingness of participants to reciprocate 
defection, that is, to defect when a link to a defector remained in place (note, this 
required the approval of both players; level of defection in DYNAMIC 64.9% ± 8.1; 
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DYNAMIC50: 72.2% ± 8.5; DYNAMIC10: 74.8% ± 4.3). We found significant higher 
levels of reciprocating a defection in DYNAMIC compared to DYNAMIC10 




Figure 3. Average cooperation level in the prisoner’s dilemma game of two newly linked participants. 
After each prisoner’s dilemma round participants could break social links. Setting new links was either 
cost-free (DYNAMIC), or else low costs of 0.10€ (DYNAMIC10) or high costs of 0.50€ (DYNAMIC50) 
arose.  




































In accordance with a previous series of experiments (Fehl, van der Post et al. 2011; 
Rand, Arbesman et al. 2011; Wang, Suri et al. 2012; Shirado, Fu et al. 2013) we 
contribute evidence on the beneficial effects of dynamic networks on cooperative 
behaviour in humans. More specifically, we build upon a rather new approach 
introduced in (Fehl, van der Post et al. 2011) where participants can choose independent 
actions for each partner. Here, cooperation in dynamic networks went beyond the purely 
reciprocity-guided cooperation of static networks. We advance previous findings by 
introducing costs that arise when one is in search for new partners. The willingness to 
break social links was clearly reduced when low costs arose. When costs were so high 
that they could not be compensated within a single interaction, participants further 
reduced their link-breaking behaviour. Nonetheless, high levels of cooperation in 
prisoner’s dilemma games were achieved (i.e. cost treatments did not differ from a 
treatment without costs). Interestingly, though participants of dynamic networks with 
no, low or high costs differed quantitatively in their link-breaking behaviour, they 
followed similar strategies. In all dynamic treatments, link-breaking rates decreased 
over time, participants mostly broke links to defective players and under mutual 
cooperation participants almost never broke links. 
Contrary to our assumption we found no impact of reduced dynamism on 
cooperative behaviour. This notion supports the view that the mere option to end 
partnerships is enough to maintain cooperation. The option of link breaking provides (i) 
the possibility to get rid of defectors, (ii) the threat of losing a partnership, as well as 
(iii) the option to stay with like-minded cooperative partners. While avoiding link 
breaking when costs occurred, participants adjusted their behaviour in the PD games in 
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response: Participants under high costs were more willing to cooperate with a newly-
linked partner compared to participants who did not have to pay for new links; and 
participants under low costs reacted themselves with higher levels of defection when a 
link to a defective partner remained in place compared to participants who did not have 
to pay for new links. These behavioural adjustments played an important role for 
maintaining high levels of cooperation. 
Currently, there is an on-going debate of how much partner switching is necessary to 
achieve the highest possible level of cooperation (Fu, Hauert et al. 2008; Fu, Wu et al. 
2009; Wang, Suri et al. 2012; Shirado, Fu et al. 2013). Previously, different rates of 
partner-switching were achieved by actively controlling them (e.g. partner-switching 
every round versus every fifth round of an evolutionary game). Contrasting, our 
dynamic-network treatments in principal allowed for the same rates of switching. 
However, rates varied greatly across treatments due to different incentives resulting 
from costs. In fact, in our high-cost dynamic networks participants broke only 2.5% of 
the existing links and still cooperated 20% more than in the static networks. Our study 
implies that it is important to investigate effects which constrain or lead to network 
dynamics naturally, in addition to the approach of setting different rates exogenously. 
Thus, our findings can inspire this debate by showing a different perspective of partner-
switching. 
In our experiment, assignment of new partners was random. As such, we have 
implemented active link breaking but not active link seeking. Both, models and 
experimental findings support the view that partner-choice based on behavioural (Wang, 
Suri et al. 2012; Shirado, Fu et al. 2013) or reputational information (Fu, Hauert et al. 
2008; Du and Fu 2011; Wang, Wang et al. 2012) fosters cooperation. Future research 
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will have to address questions whether costly partner choice will increase individuals’ 
willingness to break social links as they are given more control over future partners as 
well as whether this will make partner-switching mechanisms faster and more efficient 
in achieving cooperative outcomes.  
Furthermore, our experiment included also a more implicit form of costs as we 
constrained the maximum number of partners to three (true for all treatments). Time 
might be such a factor limiting ones interactions; but theoretically have not been found 
to derogate cooperative incentives of individuals (Poncela, Gómez-Gardeñes et al. 
2011). Moreover, while our study provides important first insights into the impact of 
costs as of seeking new interaction partners, further experiments should investigate the 
impact of different types of costs on cooperation. As discussed in the theoretical 
literature (Liu, Chen et al. 2012; Li, Min et al. 2013) such costs may, for instance, relate 
to geographical distance or migration. 
The mechanism of costly link breaking demonstrated here can also be seen as 
punitive incentive. Related cheater-control mechanisms are ostracism (Cinyabuguma, 
Page et al. 2005; Maier-Rigaud, Martinsson et al. 2010) and costly punishment (Fehr 
and Gächter 2002) of defective individuals. An Advantage of link-breaking mechanisms 
lies in the fact that they are based on individual decisions that lead to assortment and 
self-organizing processes on the level of the network (Fehl, van der Post et al. 2011). 
Hence, unlike ostracism they achieve isolation or even final exclusion of defectors 
without the necessary cooperative and coordinated decision of all group members. 
Further, costly punishment often suffers from ongoing retaliations and antisocial 
punishment (e.g. Herrmann, Thöni et al. 2008; Fehl, Sommerfeld et al. 2012). Such 
detrimental behaviour is avoided in settings where links can simply be broken. Which 
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of the two - partner switching or costly punishment - is the more favourable behaviour 
most likely depends on the environmental or social ecology of individuals. The 
interspecies mutualism of the cleaner wrasse and their clients (i.e. various reef-fish 
species) provides an example: Clients switch to a new cleaner after defection by their 
current one if they have access to several cleaners (Bshary and Schäffer 2002). This 
forces the cleaner to be more cooperative (Bshary and Grutter 2005). Whereas clients 
with access to only one cleaner  make use of punishment by chasing defective cleaners 
(Bshary and Grutter 2002).  
To conclude, we emphasize that the mere option to break the social link to a partner 
promotes cooperation among humans. Despite being reluctant to pay costs for seeking 
new partners and reducing link-breaking behaviour, participants cooperated at very high 
levels. Due to the minuscule network dynamics there was barely any room left for 
participants to assort and to alter their social environment. Thus, the difference in 
cooperation levels between the “nearly static” and the static network is even more 
remarkable. Hence, besides assortment, making relationships costly, and therefore 
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APPENDIX to Chapter I: Electronic Supplementary Material (ESM) 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
A common tool to analyse human cooperation is the so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game. In this simple two-player game, both players are given the choice between 
cooperation (play C) or defection (play D). They make their decision simultaneously 
and without communicating with each other, that is decisions are made in private. If 
both cooperate, they each receive the reward payoff (R). If one defects and the other 
cooperates, the defector receives the temptation payoff (T) and the cooperator obtains 
the sucker’s payoff (S). However, if both defect, they each receive the punishment 
payoff (P). The assumptions T > R > P > S must hold (and if the game is repeated 2R > 
T + S):  
		          	  		
      [1] 
 
If the individuals cooperate, both do better than if they had both defected (R > P). For a 
single individual, it is always better to defect no matter what the partner does (T > R 
and P > S). It is clear that under these simple rules, only defection can be evolutionarily 
stable. In other words, cooperative behaviour is vulnerable to exploitation in one-shot 
interactions. However, the dilemma can be resolved in repeated interactions by direct 
reciprocity: “If you help me, I will help you next time”. It has been shown that 
cooperation can evolve if the probability of another round is high enough and that 
























Figure S1. Decision and feedback diagram of one round. Participants played prisoner’s 
dilemma (PD) games with three partners (STATIC, panel A) or could break social links 
and receive new partners at random in either dynamic-network treatment. Setting new 
links was cost-free (DYNAMIC, panel B) or else low costs of 0.10€ (DYNAMIC10, 
panel C) or high costs of 0.50€ (DYNAMIC50, panel C) arose. For the PD decision, 
participants were asked “Do you want to play ‘orange’ or ‘blue’ ?” (orange-/blue-
buttons, see methods for details). For a link-breaking decision they were asked “Do you 
want to keep playing with this partner in the next round?” (yes-/no-buttons). If there 
were open links they were asked for a link-making decision “Do you want to receive a 
random new partner for costs of 10 [50] cents?” (yes-/no-buttons). 
 
Screenshots: decision making during the experiment  
During the experiment participants were confronted with different decisions. In the 
STATIC treatment participants saw Fig. S3 and Fig. S4 (however, no decisions could be 
made in the latter case). Additionally, in the DYNAMIC treatment participants saw Fig. 
S5a and in DYNAMIC10 and DYNAMIC50 treatments they saw Fig S5b. 
 
 
Figure S3. In the prisoner’s dilemma game, participants were asked whether to play 
“orange” (orange, in this particular case cooperation) or “blau” (blue, defection) and had 






















Figure S4. Participants were provided with the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma 
decisions (the third column indicates the participant’s payoff and the fifth column the 
partner’s payoff). In the link-breaking stage of the dynamic treatments participants were 
asked whether to continue playing with a partner and could answer “ja” (yes) or “nein” 
(no). They had to make one decision for every linked partner.  
 
Figure S5a. In the DYNAMIC treatment participants were provided with a summary of 
the link-breaking decisions. Here, the participant continues to play with Rhea 
(pseudonym); Dione declined to keep playing with the participant; and in the case of 
Nereid the participant declined to continue the relationship. Thus, the participant would 





Figure S5b. In the DYNAMIC50 (DYNAMIC10) treatment participants were also 
provided with a summary of the link-breaking decisions. In addition, for each broken 
link, participants must decide whether they wish to seek a new partner at a cost of 0.50€ 
(0.10€), i.e. answer “ja” (yes) or “nein” (no).  
 
Table S1. Statistical test details of differences in the link-breaking rate between each of 
the three dynamic-network treatments where no (DYNAMIC), low (DYNAMIC10), or 
high costs (DYNAMIC50) arose for receiving new links. 
 χ2 / W n df p 
general test: Kruskal-Wallis test 
 21.17 10 2 < 0.001 
multiple comparisons with Wilcoxon rank-sum test (3 tests) 
DYNAMIC vs. DYNAMIC10 0 10  < 0.001 
DYNAMIC vs. DYNAMIC50 0 10  < 0.001 









Figure S2. Average cooperation rates over rounds. Participants played prisoner’s 
dilemma games with three partners. Those partners were either fixed (STATIC) or 
participants could break social links after each round. In the latter case, setting new 
links was either cost-free (DYNAMIC), or else low costs of 0.10€ (DYNAMIC10) or 































Table S2. Statistical test details of differences in the average cooperation level in the 
prisoner’s dilemma games of the static-network treatment (STATIC) and the three 
dynamic-network treatments where no (DYNAMIC), low (DYNAMIC10), or high costs 
(DYNAMIC50) arose for receiving new links. 
 χ2 / W n df p 
general test: Kruskal-Wallis test 
 16.23  10 3 < 0.01 
multiple comparisons with Wilcoxon rank-sum test (6 tests) 
STATIC vs. DYNAMIC 4 10  < 0.001 
STATIC vs. DYNAMIC10 13 10  < 0.05 
STATIC vs. DYNAMIC50 5 10  < 0.01 
DYNAMIC vs. DYNAMIC10 42 10     0.58 
DYNAMIC vs. DYNAMIC50 42 10     0.58 
DYNAMIC10 vs. DYNAMIC50 47 10     0.85 
 
 
Table S3. Statistical test details of differences in the readiness to cooperate when a 
participant received a newly linked partner in the dynamic-network treatments where no 
(DYNAMIC), low (DYNAMIC10), or high costs (DYNAMIC50) arose for receiving 
new links. 
 χ2 / W n Df p 
general test: Kruskal-Wallis test 
 12.42  10 2 < 0.01 
multiple comparisons with Wilcoxon rank-sum test (3 tests) 
DYNAMIC vs. DYNAMIC10 25 10     0.06 
DYNAMIC vs. DYNAMIC50 10 10  < 0.01 






Table S4. Statistical test details of differences in the willingness of participants to 
reciprocate defection in the three dynamic-network treatments where no (DYNAMIC), 
low (DYNAMIC10), or high costs (DYNAMIC50) arose for receiving new links. 
 χ2 / W n df p 
general test: Kruskal-Wallis test 
 12.95  10 3 < 0.01 
multiple comparisons with Wilcoxon rank-sum test (3 tests) 
DYNAMIC vs. DYNAMIC10 11 10  < 0.05 
DYNAMIC vs. DYNAMIC50 31 10     0.17 
















Figure S6. The x-axis shows behaviour of both partners in the previous round, i.e. CC 
means both players played C, CD means one player played C, the other player D, etc. In 
case the link between the two players was not broken, the plots show the frequency of 
actions in the following round. For example, in DYNAMIC treatment (a), if both 
players played C and kept the link, then in the following round they both played C in 
93,65% (orange bar) of the cases. Similarly for DYNAMIC10 (b), DYNAMIC50 (c) 
and STATIC (d). This picture does not reveal how often links were kept and who of the 









































Figure S7. The x-axis shows behaviour of both partners in the previous round. The 
plots show the frequency of all possible bilateral actions of the players in the following 
round: BB, if both players decided to break the link, BK or KB, if one player decided to 













































link (KK), their actions in the following prisoner’s dilemma game can be DD, DC, CD 
or CC. Because all links are automatically kept in the STATIC treatment, it is already 
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We investigate decision-making in the Judge-Advisor-System where one person, 
the “judge”, wants to estimate the number of a certain entity and is given advice by 
another person. The question is how to combine the judge’s initial estimate and that of 
the advisor in order to get the optimal expected outcome. A previous approach 
compared two frequently applied strategies, taking the average or choosing the better 
estimate. In most situations, averaging produced the better estimates. However, this 
approach neglected a third strategy that judges frequently use, namely a weighted mean 
of the judges’ initial estimate and the advice. We compare the performance of averaging 
and choosing to weighting in a theoretical analysis. We find that weighting outperforms 
both of these strategies when the judge can, without error, detect ability differences 
between judge and advisor. If we introduce errors in the assessment of the ability 
differences, the relative performance of weighting compared to averaging or choosing 
depends on the size of the actual ability differences as well as the magnitude of the 
error. However, for a wide range of ability differences and errors, weighting is 
preferably to averaging and more so to choosing. Our analysis expands previous 
research by showing that weighting is an appropriate advice taking strategy and under 
which circumstances judges benefit most from applying it. 
 
Keywords: judgment; decision making; advice taking; modelling;  
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Optimal Decision Making under Uncertainty in the Judge-Advisor System 
 
A famous saying holds that “two heads are better than one”. Accordingly, when 
making important judgments we rarely do so on our own. Instead, we consult others for 
advice in the hope that our advisor will provide us with additional insights, expert 
knowledge or an outside perspective – in short, an independent second opinion. 
Previous research on advice taking has consistently shown that heeding advice does, in 
fact, increase the accuracy of judgments (e.g. Sniezek, Schrah et al. 2004; Gino and 
Schweitzer 2008; Minson, Liberman et al. 2011). However, a commonly observed 
phenomenon is the suboptimal utilization of advice, that is, judges do not heed the 
advice as much as they should according to its quality (e.g. Harvey and Fischer 1997; 
Yaniv and Kleinberger 2000); for reviews see (Yaniv 2004; Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). 
As a consequence, the de facto improvement in judgment quality observed in many 
judge-advisor studies is inferior to the improvement that judges could have obtained if 
they had utilized the advice in the optimal way (Minson and Mueller 2012). The critical 
question, however, is what constitutes the optimal advice taking strategy. Our main goal 
is to provide an answer to this question that goes beyond previous research. To this end, 
we will first discuss the existing approach on the optimal utilization of advice and, then, 
build on it to arrive at a normative model of advice taking. 
Our analysis will build on the logic of the framework commonly used for 
studying advice taking, the judge-advisor-system (JAS, Sniezek and Buckley 1995). In 
the JAS, one person (the “judge”) first makes an initial estimate regarding a certain 
unknown quantity and then receives advice in the form of the estimate another person 
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(the “advisor”), provided independently. The judge then makes a final, and possibly 
revised, estimate. Comparison of the initial and final estimates allows to determine the 
degree to which the judge utilized the advice, and advice utilization is usually expressed 
as the percent weight of the advice when making the final estimate (e.g. Harvey and 
Fischer 1997; Yaniv and Kleinberger 2000). The critical question is how strongly the 
judge should heed the advice in order to come up with the best possible final estimate. 
So far, our understanding of the optimal degree of advice utilization is rather limited. In 
situations in which judge and advisor are known to be equally competent or in which 
comparable expertise is the best assumption – for example when judge and advisor are 
drawn from the same population and there is not valid information on their relative 
expertise – the normatively correct strategy is to average the initial estimate and the 
advice (e.g. Harvey and Fischer 1997; Yaniv and Kleinberger 2000; Soll and Larrick 
2009). However, for situations in which there are ability differences between judge and 
advisor, determining the optimal advice taking strategy is more difficult. To the best of 
our knowledge, there is only one formal model that addresses the question of optimal 
advice utilization in the face of ability differences between judge and advisor, the PAR 




The PAR model of advice taking 
The PAR model makes statements about the effectiveness of advice taking 
strategies based on the three parameters of the JAS, ability differences between judge 
and advisor (A), the probability of the judge detecting these differences (P), and the 
degree to which the two judgments contain redundant information (R). Based on these 
parameters, the PAR model compares two very specific weighting strategies, namely 
equal weighting (i.e. averaging) and choosing the supposedly more accurate estimate. 
Averaging is a powerful strategy because it is a statistical truth that the arithmetic mean 
of the judges’ initial estimate and the advice is, on average, equally or more accurate 
than the initial estimate (Soll and Larrick 2009). If the advisor’s estimate is independent 
from the judge’s initial estimate, averaging the initial estimate and the advice results in 
a reduction of unsystematic and - in some cases - systematic errors (Yaniv 2004; Soll 
and Larrick 2009).   
The averaging strategy performs best if judge and advisor are equally competent. 
However, in real life, this might rarely be the case. For obvious reasons, averaging two 
judgments strongly differing in accuracy is unlikely to be optimal. The critical question, 
then, is how judges should utilize advice when they perceive it to be different from their 
own initial estimates with regards to accuracy. The PAR model offers an alternative to 
averaging in the form of the choosing strategy, that is, the judge either maintains the 
initial estimate or fully adopts the advice, depending on which of the two estimate he or 
she thinks is more accurate.  
The theoretical analysis of the performance of the two advice taking strategies 
suggests that judges should average their initial estimate and the advice in most of the 
53 
 
cases. That is, even if judge and advisor differ regarding their ability to perform the 
judgment task, averaging often provides better results than choosing. The exception to 
this rule are situations in which there are strong and easily identifiable ability 
differences, and the advantage of choosing increases even more if judge and advisor 
share a systematic bias. In those cases, judges are usually better off simply choosing the 
supposedly more accurate estimate. 
A possible downside of the PAR model is its focus on only two advice taking 
strategies. Soll and Larrick (Soll and Larrick 2009) provide strong arguments for this 
restriction, namely that these strategies are simple to use and that these strategies, 
averaging and choosing, account for about two thirds of the strategy choices in advice 
taking. They back up this argument with data from four experiments showing that 
judges used a choosing strategy in close to 50% of the cases and relied on averaging in 
about 20% of the cases. However, by implication this means that judges also  may have 
adhered to a third strategy more than 30% of the time, namely weighting1. In fact, while 
less frequent than choosing, judges seemed to prefer a weighting strategy to pure 
averaging based on the results of Soll and Larrick’s experiments. A study by Soll and 
Mannes (Soll and Mannes 2011) showed a similar pattern; depending on the 
experimental conditions, judges utilized a weighting strategy in about 30 to 40% of the 
trials. 
As previous studies (Soll and Larrick 2009; Soll and Mannes 2011) show, judges 
seems to engage in three rather than only two strategies when utilizing advice: 
                                                          
1 In the following, we refer to “weighting” as taking a weighted mean of the two initial estimates, with the 
weights being based on perceived competence difference. Technically, one could argue that judges apply 
one strategy which is weighting, and that averaging and choosing are simply specific manifestations of 
this strategy. While this is certainly true, we will still refer to weighting, choosing, and averaging as three 
distinct strategies in order to maintain comparability to previous research. 
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choosing, averaging, and weighting. However, the PAR model only allows us to 
compare the effectiveness of choosing and averaging. In order to make claims about the 
appropriateness of weighting, we require a different model that informs us about the 
optimal weight of advice. Ideally, we want to know for any given constellation of a 
judge and an advisor who may differ with regards to their judgmental accuracy, how 
much weight the judge should assign to the advice in order to maximize the accuracy of 
the final estimates. Importantly, and comparable to the PAR model, these optimal 
weights need to be of normative character rather than being calculated post-hoc, that is, 
we need to state - a priori - which weighting scheme has the lowest expected judgmental 
error. In the following, we will describe a model that – similar to the PAR model – 
determines the effectiveness of weighted averaging based on ability differences between 
judge and advisor, as well as the ability of the judge to detect these differences. We will 
then compare the accuracy of the final estimates that would result from weighting to the 
expected accuracy of a pure averaging strategy as well as a choosing strategy and test 




2 The Model 
 
2.1 A weighted mean minimizes the error of the final estimates 
 
For the purpose of our model, and in accordance with the basic JAS, we assume 
that two people, a judge A and an advisor B, are tasked with estimating an unknown 
quantity (e.g. the distance between two cities). They first provide independent estimates, 
and then A wants to find the best possible final estimate after receiving B´s estimate as 
advice. Let us denote A´s a priori estimate by xA and B´s a priori estimate by xB. Let us 
further assume for simplicity that the judgments of both judge and advisor follow a 
Gaussian distribution centered on the true value xT with variances σA² and σB². First, we 
determine the most accurate final estimate in the case that A knows both his or her own 
error variance and that of the advisor. We compute the most likely estimate x̃ with the 
Maximum-Likelihood method. Since xA and xB are drawn from independent 
distributions, their joint density function is given by 
 = 	 = ² 	 12 !"
#²# 	 12 !"	
= 
$%² &#²# '2 !!  
To optimize the expression with respect to x̃ we get 
(( )log	- = −12 (( % − ²! +  − ²! '	
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= 1!  − ² + 1!  − ² = 0 
Solving with respect to x̃ gives 
 = ! + !! + !  
which is a weighted average of xA and xB. In other words, our formal analysis shows that 
if the error variance of judge and advisor are known the expected error of the final 
estimate is minimal if that estimate is a weighted average of the judge’s initial estimate 
and the advice. From the expression above, we can further derive that the optimal 
weight of the advice is 
1 = !! + ! 
Under the assumptions stated above, the optimal weight of the advice is the ratio 
of the advisor´s error variance and the sum of the combined error variances of judge and 
advisor. In other words, this weight represents the proportion of error variance in the 
combined estimate that is due to the judge´s imprecision. Likewise, the weight of the 
judge’s estimate is the ratio of the advisor´s error variance and the combined error 
variances of the two judgments. On a conceptual level, the model indicates that the 
advice should be weighted more the higher the imprecision of the judge´s initial 
estimate is. For example if the judge´s error variance is 1 arbitrary unit and the advisor´s 
error variance is 3 of those units, we can easily compute that the weight that should be 
placed on the advice is 25%, and if both error variances are equal, the optimal strategy 
is to weight the advice by 50%. 
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2.2 Comparing weighting to averaging and choosing 
In this section we fist compare the optimally weighted average with the 
arithmetic (non-weighted) average x̄. 
̅ = 12  +  
First, let us recall that for any random variable X and a real number a, we have 
Var67 = 6²Var7 
Further, if X and Y follow independent Gaussian distributions 89 , !9² and 8;, !;², 
respectively, then their sum X+Y also follows a Gaussian distribution with expected 
value 89&; = 89 + 8;	and variance !²9&; = !²9 + !²;. 
 
Now we look at the distributions of x̃ and x̄. Since they are both linear transformations 
of xA and xB we can directly apply the above two rules. Thus, x̃ and x̄ follow a Gaussian 
distribution with expected value xT and the variances 
!< = !!! + !	
!= = 14 ! + ! 
where !<  is the error variance of the weighted mean and != is the error variance of the 
arithmetic mean. As stated above, weighting will perform equal or better than averaging 
because !< ≤ != with equality only if ! = !.  
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Further, and also in line with our reasoning stated above, we can see that 
!< ≤ min	!, !. This means that for any quality of advisors (that is, for any !), the 
judge will necessarily provide a more accurate final estimate when taking the weighted 
mean  x̃ instead of choosing either the initial estimate xA or the advice xB with equality 
only if either ! or ! equals zero. The same does not hold for the arithmetic mean x̄: 
for example, if the advisor is much worse than the judge (more precisely: if 3! ≤ !.), 
averaging will lead to less accurate final estimates than choosing the initial guess xA. In 
other words, unlike pure averaging the optimal weighing strategy is always superior to 
choosing. 
The downside of both weighting and choosing is, obviously, the need for 
additional information, namely knowledge of the ability difference between judge and 
advisor. We express these ability differences as the ratio of error variances. 
D = !! 
The ratio m expresses how much the judge is more accurate than the advisor. If 
m > 1 the judge is more accurate than the advisor and if m < 1 the advisor is more 
accurate than the judge. We only require this single piece of additional information 
because we can express the weighted mean x̃ as a function of m: 
 = D1 +D + 11 +D 
 
Essentially, the model further yields two intuitive insights: first, as long as the 
error variance of both the judge and the advisor is nonzero and limited, their judgments 
59 
 
should never be completely ignored, that is, weighting is bound to yield more accurate 
judgments than choosing the more accurate judgment. Second, the expected error of the 
weighted average is always smaller or equal to that of the arithmetic mean (they are 
equal if the optimal weight is 0.5). On a theoretical level perfect weighting is therefore, 




2.3 The effect of errors in assessing the ability differences 
As we have shown in the previous section, perfect weighting is superior to 
choosing and equal to or better than pure averaging. However, perfect weighting 
requires that the ability difference between judge and advisor is known to the judge. 
Despite judges’ ability to differentiate between good and bad advice beyond chance 
level (e.g. Harvey and Fischer 1997; Harvey, Harries et al. 2000; Yaniv and Kleinberger 
2000; Yaniv 2004), exact knowledge of m is rather unlikely. Let us, accordingly, 
assume that m has to be estimated by the judge and is, therefore, subject to errors or 
biases. In essence, regardless of whether such a mistake is systematic or not, the judge 
can either under- or overestimate the true value of m, and we denote the degree to which 
the judge does so by the factor p. If p equals 1, the judge has a perfect representation of 
the ability differences. In contrast, values greater than 1 indicate that the judge’s 
perception of the ability erroneously shift in his or her favor, whereas values smaller 
than 1 mean that the judge overestimates the ability of the advisor. Assuming the judge 
estimates the competence difference m with a mistake of p, the final result reads as 
 =  ED1 + ED +  11 + ED 
And the variance of E is given by 
!F =	D²E²! + !1 + ED²  
In this case, the final estimate obtained by weighting the two initial estimates 
differently might end up being worse than taking the simple average. This would 
happen if the competence difference is (i) not very large and (ii) poorly estimated. The 
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weighted mean might also end up being worse than choosing the better guess. This 
would happen if the ability difference is actually large, but is perceived as small, but in 
the correct order. To see the full picture we map the relative improvement 
G = error	variance	of	final	estimateerror	variance	of	initial	estimate 
 
of the judge against the real competence difference m. Values smaller than 1 indicate 
that the error variance of the final estimates is smaller than that of the initial estimate, 
that is, the final estimates are more accurate. In contrast, if the final estimates are less 
accurate than the initial estimates, r will assume values greater than 1. We determined 
the expected values of r for the three advice taking strategies as a function of the 
parameters m and p.  
For the simple average, we get 
G=NOP=QRSQD = !=! = 14!
 + !! = 1 +D4  
  
For weighting, we get 
	
G<ORQTURSQD, E = !F! =	D²E²!
 + !1 + ED²! = D²E²1 + ED² + D1 + ED² = D1 + E²D1 + ED²  
Assuming that the better expert is identified correctly, the ratio r of the variances of 
initial and final estimate is given by 
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GVTWWXRSQ,VWPPOVUD = Y1, Z	D > 1D, Z	D < 1 
If the wrong expert is chosen, then 1 and m must be exchanged in the formula. 
GVTWWXRSQ,<PWSQD = YD, Z	D > 11, Z	D < 1  
Whether the correct expert is identified or not depends on m and p. If the judge has 
higher expertise and is overconfident (m > 1, p > 1) the choice is correct. Similarly, if 
the advisor has higher expertise and the judge overestimates the advisor’s expertise (m < 
1, p < 1), the choice will also be correct. In general, the choice is correct if and only if 
the perceived competence ratio pm and the real competence ratio m are either both 
greater than 1 or less than 1.  
GVTWWXRSQD, E
= ]GVTWWXRSQ,VWPPOVUD, if	D > 1	and	ED > 1	or	D < 1	and	ED < 1GVTWWXRSQ,<PWSQD,																																																																																											else  
In order to provide a simple comparison of the three advice taking strategies, we 
plotted their respective values of r against the ability differences m. We used a LogLog 
Plot2 (Fig.1) to visualize the relevant part of the parameter space. In line with the 
reasoning above, the left panel of Figure 1 shows that in an ideal environment, in which 
the judge can correctly assess the ability differences, weighting is bound to outperform 
both averaging and choosing. However, as the right panel shows, the relative 
                                                          
2
 A brief explanation for readers unfamiliar with LogLog plots: Since the variables m and r that we wish 
to plot are relations, we need to scale the axes accordingly. A value of m = 0.5 means that the judge is 
twice as good as the advisor while m = 2 means that the advisor is twice as good as the judge. Similarly 
for m = 0.1 and m = 10. This means that we need to treat the two intervals (0; 1) and (1;∞) equally. 
Further, we must center the plot around 1 instead of 0 because a value of m = 1 indictaes equal accuracy 
of judge and advisor. Log(-arithmic) scaling does both of these things. Double logarithmic scaling (i.e., 
LogLog Plots) scales both axes logarithmically. 
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performance of the three strategies changes when we introduce errors in estimating the 
ability differences. In the example we chose, the judge overestimates his/her ability 
relative to that of the advisor by 200% (i.e. p = 3). In this case, averaging outperforms 
weighting for small ability differences, and choosing outperforms weighting if the 






Figure 1: Plots of relative improvement of accuracy (i.e., reduction of variance) before 
and after considering the advisor’s advice using three different methods: Choosing the 
better estimate (red), averaging both estimates equally (blue), and weighting the 
estimates according to competence difference (green). In (a) we assume that weighting 
and choosing are perfectly correct. In (b), the judge overestimates his/her ability relative 
to that of the advisor by 200% (i.e., p = 3), resulting in imperfect weighting and, for 
some values of m, choosing the wrong estimate. Both axes are in logarithmic scale.  
 
This brief example shows that we need a more detailed analysis to shed light on 
the question which advice taking strategy performs better in a given situation. To this 
end, we need to compare the relative improvement in accuracy obtained by the different 
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strategies as a function of the model parameters p and m. Specifically, we are interested 
in the relative performance of weighting on one hand and either choosing or averaging 
on the other (for an in-depth comparison of choosing and averaging, see Soll and 
Larrick, 2009), which we denote as 
_=NOP=QRSQ = P`abcdebfcPghaigcbfc  and _VTWWXRSQ = P`abcdebfcPjdkklbfc , respectively. 
A value of k = 1 indicates that weighting and the comparison strategy (averaging or 
choosing) perform equally well whereas values of k > 1 indicate superior performance 
of weighting and values of k < 1 indicate that the respective comparison strategy 
performs better. The target value k is represented by the color and shade in the contour 
plot spanned by the parameters m and p (see Fig. 2). The bold line separating the blue 
and green areas is the iso-accuracy curve which indicates that the accuracy of the 
weighting strategy equals that of the comparison strategy (i.e. k = 1).  For each 
subsequent line in the green area, k increases by 0.1, that is, the weighting-method 
performs 10% better than the comparison strategy, while in the blue area the opposite is 








Figure 2: Contour plot of the relative difference of averaging/weighting (a) and 
choosing/weighting (b). In the green area, weighting is the better option despite 
erroneous assessment of the ability differences between judge and advisor, while in the 
blue area simple averaging (a), or choosing (b), performs better. The contour lines 
denote increases or decreases in steps of 10%. 
 
 As can be seen in the left panel of Figure 2, if there are ability differences 
between judge and advisor and the judge has a rough representation of these differences, 
weighting is superior to pure averaging. In contrast, whenever the ability differences are 
small and/or difficult to detect, judges will benefit more from averaging. The accuracy 
differences between weighting and choosing are more pronounced (see the left panel of 
Figure 2). Obviously, the judge must make extreme errors when assessing m in order for 
choosing to be the better advice taking strategy. In addition, choosing can outperform 
weighting only if the more accurate person’s estimates are chosen. This is the case 
above the white diagonal (Fig. 2b) for m > 1, and below the diagonal for m < 1. Note 
that the second prerequisite creates an asymmetry in the results. This asymmetry is 
rooted in the fact that choosing is heavily penalized if the judge erroneously chooses the 
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wrong estimate while weighting is much less prone to such extreme errors because it 




2.4 Combining Averaging and Choosing 
Our analysis so far revealed that weighting is quite a powerful strategy when 
comparing it to either weighting or choosing. However, one rationale that we can derive 
from Soll and Larrick’s (2009) PAR model is that judges should switch between 
averaging and choosing in order to maximize the accuracy of their final estimates. 
Specifically, they should average when ability differences are small and/or difficult to 
detect and choose when the opposite is true. An interesting vantage point, then, is to 
compare weighting to a combination of choosing and averaging. Let us, for simplicity, 
assume that judges know when they should switch from averaging to choosing based on 
their (potentially biased) perception of m. We can easily compute this threshold by 
equating GVTWWXRSQ,VWPPOVU and G=NOP=QRSQ which gives pm = 3 or pm = 1/3. In other 
words, a perfect application of the combined strategy implies that judges average their 
initial estimates and the advice until they perceive the initial estimates to be three times 
as accurate as the advice or vice versa; if this threshold is passed, they choose the more 
accurate estimate. If m is estimated without error (i.e., p = 1), dynamically switching 
between choosing and averaging is an extremely powerful strategy. However, we have 
to take into account that if p ≠ 1, choosing will not always be correct, since the judge 
may erroneously choose the less accurate judgment. This problem may drastically 
reduce the performance of the combined strategy, because choosing the wrong expert 
has highly negative consequences.  
In order to compare weighting to the combined strategy of choosing and 
averaging, we first determine the accuracy gains relative to the initial estimates that 
would result from a combination of choosing and averaging, GVWmnRSOo. Figure 3 (left 
panel) compares the accuracy ratios of the combined strategy as well as that of 
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weighting as a function of m and assuming that the judge is strongly overestimating his 
or her own  accuracy (p = 3). We next calculated the ratio of the accuracy gain obtained 
by weighting and that obtained by the combined strategy 
_VWmnRSOo = P`abcdebfcPjkpqbfar .   
The right panel of Figure 3 shows _VWmnRSOo as a function of m and p. The white 
lines denote the threshold at which judges switch from averaging to choosing based on 
their perception of the relative accuracy of judge and advisor (i.e. when the product pm 
is greater than 3 or smaller than 1/3). The bold lines, again, denote the iso-accuracy-
curves. The analysis reveals some interesting findings. First, weighting is superior to the 
combined strategy in a wide range of situations. Second, the superiority of the 
weighting strategy is mostly due to the relatively weak performance of choosing. 
Specifically, application of the combined strategy leads judges to choose in situations in 
which averaging would outperform weighting but choosing does not, for example when 
ability differences are small but difficult to assess.  Instances where the choosing part of 
the combined strategy performs better than the weighting strategy occur only for 








Figure 3: Comparing weighting to the combination of choosing and averaging. In (a) 
we plot the relative improvement of accuracy (as in Fig.1) of weighting (green) and the 
combined method (red), both for p = 3.  Note that imperfect estimation of m leads to 
choosing the wrong judgment in a specific area. In (b) we generalize the picture by 
allowing for varying p (as in Fig. 2). In the green area, weighting is the better strategy, 
while in the blue area the combined method performs better. The contour lines denote 






The aim of our theoretical analysis was to answer the question which advice-
taking strategy judges in a judge-advisor system should utilize in order to maximize the 
accuracy of their revised estimates. Previous research has suggested that judges should 
average their initial estimates and the advice unless the difference in accuracy between 
the two estimates is large and easily identifiable; in such cases they should simply 
choose the more accurate estimate (Soll & Larrick, 2009). It is a mathematical fact that 
averaging two independent and unbiased estimates leads to, on average, more accurate 
judgments (e.g. Yaniv 2004; Larrick and Soll 2006). However, if the error variance of 
the two judgments is unequal, there is an optimal weight of advice that produces 
combined estimates that are always equal or better than simple averaging with regards 
to accuracy. As a consequence, judges in a judge-advisor system would benefit the most 
from weighting the advice according to its accuracy relative to that of the judges’ initial 
estimate (Budescu, Fiedler et al. 2006; Budescu and Yu 2006). Similar to choosing the 
better estimate, the potential superiority of the weighting strategy compared to pure 
averaging comes at the cost of additional information, namely knowledge of the ability 
difference between judge and advisor.  
If this ability difference is known, a weighting strategy is bound to be superior to 
both, averaging and choosing. Yet, it is rather unlikely that judges will be able to 
correctly recognize differences between their own and their advisor’s ability with 
perfect accuracy. Instead, previous research suggests that while judges have some 
ability to assess the relative quality of advice they frequently underestimate it (e.g. 
Harvey and Fischer 1997; Harvey, Harries et al. 2000; Yaniv and Kleinberger 2000). In 
other situations, for example, when judges perceive the task as very difficult (Gino and 
71 
 
Moore 2007) or when they are very anxious, they are prone to overestimate the quality 
of the advice relative to that of their own initial estimates (Gino, Brooks et al. 2012). If 
judges’ assessment of the ability differences are subject to errors the resulting weighting 
strategy will result in less accurate judgments, and if these errors become too large, 
simple averaging turns out to be the better strategy. The fact that the averaging strategy 
can outperform weighting strategies that are based on erroneous weights has been 
previously documented in multi-cue judgments (Dawes 1979), and the advantage of 
averaging increases as the number of cues grows. Hence, the first question we aimed to 
answer was under which conditions imperfect weighting outperforms averaging. To this 
end, we compared he expected performance of both strategies as a function of ability 
differences between judge and advisor as well as the accuracy of the judge when 
estimating these differences. 
Our analysis revealed that imperfect weighting outperforms averaging as long as 
there are at least moderate ability differences. This performance advantage of the 
weighting strategy is rather robust against moderate misperceptions of the ability 
differences. For example, if the judge’s error was 50% larger than that of the advisor, 
weighting is superior to averaging even if the judge under- or overestimates the ability 
difference by 50%. Additionally, the larger the ability differences become the more 
robust the weighting strategy becomes against erroneous assessment of these 
differences. In other words, averaging is likely to produce better estimates than 
imperfect weighting only when ability differences are small and/or difficult to detect. 
We also compared an imperfect weighting strategy to imperfect choosing, 
finding that the former outperformed the latter with very few exceptions. Specifically, 
choosing was superior to weighting only when there were large differences in accuracy 
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which the judge recognized but severely underestimated. The reason for this finding is 
that the choosing strategy is insensitive to the magnitude of the ability differences 
whereas the weighting strategy is not. Consider the case where the advisor is much 
more accurate than the judge but the judge erroneously perceives the advisor to be only 
slightly better than him- or herself. In this case the judge will still correctly identify the 
advisor as the expert, and because the actual difference in expertise is large, choosing 
the advice will produce a rather good result. In contrast, weighting will produce a final 
estimate that is not too different from (but slightly superior to) the one obtained by 
averaging because the difference in weights is bound to be small. Based on the 
misperception of the ability differences, the judge does not assign enough weight to the 
advice. 
Finally, we compared imperfect weighting to a strategy that dynamically 
switches from averaging to choosing when the (potentially biased) perceived ability 
differences between judge and advisor become large (Soll and Larrick, 2009). Our 
analysis revealed that weighting is superior to the combined strategy in a wide range of 
situations. Interestingly, weighting is better than the combined strategy mainly because 
the application of the combined strategy leads judges to choose between estimates in 
situations where averaging would outperform weighting. These situations are 
characterized by the judge correctly recognizing whether the advisor is more competent 
than him- or herself or vice versa, but at the same time extremely overestimating the 
ability differences. The interesting thing about those situations is that simple averaging 
would have performed better than weighting, but since the ability differences are 




Implications and directions for future research 
An important implication of our analysis is that weighting is a viable strategy in 
advice taking. The fact that participants in previous studies adhered to this strategy in a 
substantial number of trials (Soll and Larrick 2009; Soll and Mannes 2011) as well as its 
potential superiority to averaging highlight its importance when studying advice taking. 
Whereas the PAR model suggests that judges should engage in averaging in case of 
small or difficult to detect ability difference and rely on choosing otherwise, our 
analysis makes a partially different statement. In case of small and difficult to detect 
ability differences, averaging is still the best option. However, in case the ability 
differences become larger and easier to detect, judges should attempt to weight the two 
judgments by perceived accuracy instead of choosing between the two. Interestingly, 
weighting the two estimates by their perceived accuracy allows judges to mimic an 
aggregation strategy that has proven to be very effective if three or more judgments are 
involved, namely taking the median. Research on group judgment (Bonner & Baumann, 
2008; Bonner, Gonzalez, & Sommer, 2004; Bonner, Sillito, & Baumann, 2007) suggests 
that the way in which groups or judges combine the individual estimates is best 
described by the median or similar models that discount outliers. The same is true when 
judges combine several independent judgments (Yaniv, 1997) or receive advice from 
multiple advisors (Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007). Importantly, the median strategy 
outperforms the average because it discounts extreme judgments which are usually less 
accurate. Naturally, in the JAS with only one advisor, the median is per definition, equal 
to the mean, but assigning more weight to the more accurate judgment, even if the 
weight is not optimal due to misperceptions of the ability differences, also leads to 
discounting the less accurate judgments. 
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Our theoretical analysis does not only provide a normative framework to 
compare the expected performance of different advice taking strategies. It also allows to 
evaluate the effectiveness of judges’ advice taking strategies. Similar to (Soll and 
Larrick 2009) empirical analysis, our model provides performance baselines against 
which to compare the de facto improvements in accuracy between judges’ initial and 
final estimates. Soll and Larrick’s analyses already showed that in the majority of the 
cases frequent averagers outperformed frequent choosers. An interesting question 
would, then, be whether or under which conditions frequent weighting can outperform 
frequent averaging. 
Finally, a potential venue for further developing our model would be to include 
biased judgments. In our theoretical analysis, we made the simplifying assumption that 
there is no systematic bias in the judge´s and advisor´s estimates. Incorporating 
systematic biases of judge and advisor will necessarily make the model more complex, 
but it may be worthwhile if it allows us to draw conclusions about the relative 
performance of weighting, choosing and averaging in a wider range of decision 
situations. 
Conclusion 
Advice taking is not only an integral part of our daily social reality; it is also one 
of the most effective ways to increase the quality of our judgments and decisions. In 
order to make the best use of the wisdom of others, we need a thorough understanding 
of how well we utilize advice depending on its quality. An elegant way to provide 
answers to this question is provided by normative models of advice taking. We built on 
and extended the most prominent normative model of advice taking and, by doing so, 
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furthered our understanding of how effective different advice taking strategies are in 
different situations. More importantly, however, normative modelling allows us to 
detect and, ultimately intervene against, deviations from optimal strategies, that is, they 
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The evolution of cooperation has become a widely-studied interdisciplinary field of 
research. Nevertheless, the processes related to cooperative behavior are still not fully 
understood, especially among humans. Empirical studies are consistently lagging 
behind models, because they are often difficult to design and time-consuming compared 
to modelling. In chapter I, I present a study which contributes to the literature on 
empirical studies of network reciprocity. The key feature of dynamic networks is that 
individuals can switch partners. Realistically, switching partners requires costs in terms 
of time or resources. Since such costs have been neglected in most of the present 
models and in all present experiments this work closes this gap. I showed that costs 
significantly reduce the dynamism on dynamic networks. But most importantly, 
cooperative behavior stayed at high levels even with such a reduced dynamism. 
Essentially, this sheds new light on the mechanism that drives cooperation on dynamic 
networks. The important difference for cooperation is whether participants have the 
option to switch partners or not.  
Chapter II of the present thesis is concerned with advice taking. In the context of advice 
taking, I investigated how advice should be weighted optimally. I derived a 
mathematical model that compared three strategies, choosing, averaging and weighting. 
If the advisor’s competence is sufficiently different from the judge or if the difference is 
easy to guess, weighting is the best strategy. Averaging turns out to be optimal if the 
difference is small or hard to guess. Choosing is best only in exceptional and unrealistic 
parameter regions. My results extend present models by highlighting the benefits of 
weighting and justify empirical findings where participants seemed to prefer weighting 
over other strategies. 
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Currently, there is only minimal scientific exchange between these two research areas. 
However, in the evolution of cooperation, information plays an important role, 
particularly in form of reputation. While reputation seems to be especially relevant for 
humans, other species are able to make use of reputation, too. A recent study shows that 
cleaner fish and their clients effectively use reputation to maintain cooperative behavior 
(Bshary and Grutter 2006). In advice taking literature, a robust finding is that 
participants are inclined to put too much weight on their own opinion (e.g. Harvey and 
Fischer 1997; Yaniv and Kleinberger 2000). Interestingly, the very opposite has been 
found in an experiment on the effects of gossip on human cooperation (Sommerfeld, 
Krambeck et al. 2007). Here, participants received full information on the cooperative 
behavior of their partners and, additionally, gossip about them. The gossip consisted of 
short statements of other players who had previously played with that person. 
Surprisingly, participants adjusted their behavior due to gossip even though it contained 
no additional information. 
A possible explanation of the difference between over-using information from gossip in 
cooperation experiments and under-using information in advice taking is that humans 
are sensible to the specific kind of information. In advice taking, typical tasks include 
guessing difficult quantities, e.g. the average yearly water consumption of Japanese 
households. Future work could focus on identifying whether different types of 
information lead to different weighting patterns and, if so, why. On the other hand, 
experiments on human cooperation could be inspired by the advice taking literature as 
well. If participants received some information about the behavior of their partners by 
others and some by own observation, it could be analyzed how they distribute weights 
on the two sources of information. 
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Thus, the major outlook for future research is to integrate reputation in social networks, 
and also take into consideration how humans deal with advice by others. Clearly, future 
models must give specific and testable predictions. Empiricists, on the other hand 
should try to understand the underlying mechanisms of models. Understanding and 
good communication between empiricists and theoreticians are especially relevant in the 
evolution of cooperation and advice taking, because both topics rely on a balanced 





Cooperative behaviour is widespread among humans and throughout the animal 
kingdom. Previous models suggest that the evolution of cooperation can be enhanced by 
network structure. However, recent experiments were not able to detect cooperation-
enhancing capabilities in static networks. Only if the network is dynamic, experiments 
with humans report increased cooperative behaviour. Since dynamic networks imply the 
possibility of changing partners, an important aspect is how costs for changing partners 
affect behaviour. Since this aspect has been neglected so far, chapter I of this work is 
dedicated to close this gap and explore the effects of costs on dynamic networks. I 
showed that the willingness to break links is drastically reduced when links to new 
partners are costly. For very high costs, the rate of breaking links was so low that the 
network was nearly static. Interestingly, cooperative behaviour stayed at a high level 
nevertheless. This implies that cooperative behaviour depends, above all, on whether 
there is an option to switch partners or not. Even if costs are so high that this option is 
rarely used, cooperation levels are substantially higher than without the option.  
Chapter II of this thesis is dedicated to the investigation of decision-making. In the so-
called Judge-Advisor-System, one person, the judge, estimates an unknown quantity. 
Then, the judge receives advice from another person, the advisor. Importantly, the 
estimates by the judge and the advisor are made independently. The task is to find out 
how the judge should best use the information from the advisor. Existing approaches 
mainly focused on two methods, (i) taking the average, and (ii) choosing one of the 
initial estimates. This simplistic approach is mainly driven by empirical data, where it 
seems that in some experiments over 70% of participants used one of these methods. 
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However, other weights are also frequently assigned and a thorough theoretical 
investigation of optimal weights is necessary. Therefore, I derived a normative model 
that tells under which circumstances it is better to (i) take the average, to (ii) choose 
what you think is the better estimate or to (iii) try to assign proper weights. Which of 
the three is the best depends on the difference in expertise of judge and advisor as well 
as on the judge’s likelihood to know this difference. If the judge has a good 
representation of this difference, assigning weights is always the best bet. The simple 
average is useful if the difference in expertise is small or difficult to guess. Finally, 
choosing performs well if the difference is large but its amount is difficult to guess. 
Motivated by previous approaches, I also explored the performance of a combination of 
choosing and averaging, i.e. a method that uses averaging for small difference in 
expertise and choosing for a large difference. Surprisingly, the performance of this 
combined method was very poor. The main reason is the uncertainty in guessing the 
difference of expertise. Therefore, assigning proper weights is almost always better than 
using the combined method. Since choosing the worse expert has performs so poorly, 
the combined method requires that the risk of choosing the wrong person is low. But 
this means that the difference in expertise is easy to guess and therefore weighting is the 






Kooperatives Verhalten lässt sich in vielen Bereichen menschlichen Zusammenlebens 
sowie im gesamten Tierreich beobachten. In evolutionären Modellen wurde gezeigt, 
dass Netzwerkstrukturen die Kooperation erhöhen können. Empirische Studien 
versuchten vergeblich diesen Mechanismus auch bei Menschen nachzuweisen. Es 
scheint, als würden Netzwerke nur dann die Kooperation erhöhen, wenn die Strukturen 
nicht statisch sind, sondern dynamisch. Das heißt, dass die Individuen die Möglichkeit 
haben, ihre Partner zu wechseln. Eine wichtige – aber bislang unerforschte – 
Eigenschaft dynamischer Netzwerke ist jedoch, dass derartige Wechsel von Partnern in 
der Regel Kosten verursachen, ob in Form von Zeit oder Ressourcen. Kapitel I meiner 
Arbeit schließt diese Lücke, in dem es sich mit den Effekten von Kosten auf 
dynamischen Netzwerken befasst. Ich konnte nachweisen, dass Menschen seltener 
Interaktionen mit Partnern beendeten, wenn die Kontaktaufnahme mit einem neuen 
Partner mit Kosten verbunden war. Bei sehr hohen Kosten, wurden Partner so selten 
gewechselt, dass das Netzwerk fast statisch war. Interessanterweise blieb die 
Kooperation dennoch sehr hoch. Das bedeutet, dass für kooperatives Verhalten 
entscheidend ist, ob man die Möglichkeit hat, Partner zu wechseln. Im Gegensatz zu 
bisherigen Annahmen ist es daher nicht wichtig, wie oft tatsächlich Partner gewechselt 
werden, sondern lediglich ob es die Möglichkeit dazu gibt.  
In Kapitel II beschäftige ich mich mit optimalem Entscheidungsverhalten. Im 
sogenannten Judge-Advisor-System geht es darum, dass eine Person, der Judge, eine 
unbekannte numerische Größe schätzen will. Dazu erhält der Judge eine zweite 
unabhängige Schätzung als Rat von einer zweiten Person, des Advisor. Schließlich ist 
die Frage, wie der Judge optimal den Rat verwerten kann um seine Anfangsschätzung 
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zu verbessern. Bisherige Forschung konzentrierte sich hauptsächlich auf zwei mögliche 
Methoden, (i) das Bilden des Mittelwerts und (ii) das Wählen der besseren 
Anfangsschätzung. Das Hauptargument für diese einfachen Methoden ist deren häufige 
Verwendung in bisherigen Experimenten. Allerdings wurden sehr wohl auch andere 
Gewichtungen beobachtet und daher ist eine gründliche Analyse der optimalen 
Gewichtung erforderlich. In der vorliegenden Arbeit leitete ich ein normatives Modell 
her, das beschreibt, unter welchen Bedingungen welche Methode das bestmögliche 
Ergebnis liefert. Es wurden drei Methoden verglichen: (i) das Bilden des Durchschnitts, 
(ii) das Wählen der besseren Anfangsschätzung, und (iii) das Bilden eines gewichtetet 
Mittelwerts, wobei das Gewicht vom Kompetenzunterschied abhängt. Welche Methode 
optimal ist, hängt davon ab, wie groß der Kompetenzunterschied ist und wie gut er vom 
Judge erkannt wird. Die Durchschnittbildung ist immer dann vorteilhaft, wenn der 
Kompetenzunterschied nicht groß ist, oder nur schwer richtig eingeschätzt werden kann. 
Wenig überraschend lohnt sich das Wählen der besseren Anfangsschätzung, wenn der 
Kompetenzunterschied hinreichend groß ist, vorausgesetzt es wird tatsächlich die 
bessere Anfangsschätzung gewählt. Wenn der Kompetenzunterschied vom Judge gut 
eingeschätzt werden kann, ist eine Entsprechende Gewichtung immer die beste 
Methode, unabhängig vom tatsächlichen Unterschied. In Übereinstimmung mit 
bisheriger Forschung wurde auch die Kombination von Durchschnittbildung und 
Wählen der besseren Anfangsschätzung untersucht. Diese Kombinationsmethode beruht 
darauf, bei als gering eingeschätztem Kompetenzunterschied den Durchschnitt zu bilden 
und ansonsten die bessere Anfangsschätzung zu wählen. Interessanterweise schneidet 
diese Kombinationsmethode sehr schlecht ab, was hauptsächlich daran liegt, dass zu oft 
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die falsche Anfangsschätzung genommen würde. Insgesamt ist das gewichtete Mittel 
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